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ass; *ashum*, spirit; *bitug*, silver or money; *atreshent*, sour milk, the last word having a Coptic sound; *sanno*, dog; *handawil*, Turkish maize, a word made also use of by the Egyptian fellahs. Also *hantif*, the camel; *baruah*, fat; *buhus*, beans; *damani*, thief, all these are foreign words, though they sound like Arabic words.

Possibly, though I have no means of ascertaining this, these words may be derived from the Berber language. It is, however, surprising, that among the verbs there are some quoted in old Arabic dictionaries as genuine Arabic, though they have now become obsolete. The word *habag*, he struck, is already inserted in Feiruzabadi's large dictionary, *Kāmus*; *shaffara*, he cut, is manifestly allied to the old Arabic *shufrah*, the knife; *nabbata*, he cried, is not improbably connected with the old generic name *nabat* (plural *anbat*), by which the Arabs designate all other people speaking a different language, whom the Greeks called "barbarians". It is also remarkable that the word *watib*, to sit, which according to the Arabic lexicographers has the same signification in the old Arabic dialect of the Himjares, whilst *utib* and *etutib* correspond in signification to the modern Arabic *watab* to rise up.

I confine myself to note these philological facts without drawing from them any hazardous inferences, for which the material at hand is scarcely sufficient. The old original words seem to become obsolete, and are replaced, according to a conventional scheme, by an Arabic slang. Thus the Egyptian gipsies have probably forgotten the ancient names for colours, sun, moon, earth, fire, etc., and know only their Arab denominations

ON THE IDEAS OF SPECIES AND RACE APPLIED TO MAN AND HUMAN SOCIETY: ON ANTHROPOLOGY AND ETHNOLOGY.*

BY M. COURNOT.

IN all ages, men have busied themselves with the question of knowing how far they ought to consider themselves as relations or strangers to each other. For a long time, the sentiment of the relationship and the consanguinity of all those who speak the same language, and observe the same ceremonies and customs, acted with great energy. On the other hand, the disgust and aversion for foreign

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populations, reputed barbarous, because they did not speak the same language,—impious, because they did not adore the same gods,—and coarse, because they had not the same manners,—inspired a sort of repugnance for every idea of relationship or consanguinity with them. Indigenous cosmogonies did not trouble themselves with the origin of foreigners, or did so only to explain, after their own fashion, the stamp of reprobation that they bore. If, in accordance with the myth, these foreigners were relations in a coarse and animal sense, at all events they had ceased to be of the family; they were relations disinherited and disavowed. Religious institutions,—in the ancient way in which they were developed and organised according to the ideas of purity and impurity,—only served to strengthen the idea of an original separation among peoples, and even among castes, who spoke the same language, but who found themselves, if not fused together, at least so put into juxtaposition and so combined as to form one and the same people.

Later, another class of religious institutions, whose principle is essentially different, and which we may call *proselytising religions*, produced a totally different effect. The same faith, and the expectation of a common destiny, tended to reunite those who had been separated from each other by the dissimilarity of their coarse superstitions, or the heterogeneousness of religious systems of deeper signification. This end, however, they could not obtain without insisting upon the idea of an original brotherhood between men, expressed in a manner to make it attractive and popular. Besides this, and independently of all religious influence, it is the property of a progressive civilisation to disentangle the bonds of that complete union which depends upon the conformity of language, manners, and institutions; and to extend in every way the prevalence of everything which is universal in human nature over that which is peculiar to separate times, places, classes, and nationalities. When once society has entered on this phase, men find themselves compelled more and more to put the idea of humanity above the idea of every particular nationality, and even above the idea of every religious confraternity. In modern language this is called philanthropy, and philanthropy is not a thing which ought to be ridiculed, notwithstanding the way it has been abused.

I have shown the reasons why we cannot raise, even with the utmost scientific impartiality, the famous question of the unity of the human species, or the principle of the diversity of the races of man, without awakening religious and philanthropic susceptibility. Not that so much importance exactly is attached to the scientific formula of the unity of the species, as because there is mentally

associated with it another idea, which can be easily comprehended even by those most destitute of scientific education; namely, the idea of the descent from a single pair. And yet, in the kind of facts with which natural science deals, there is no more reason to admit, in the case of the human species, the hypothesis of the descent from a single pair, than to admit it in the case of every other living species. Can all the oaks of the same species have issued from the same acorn? or all the bees from the same queen bee? Must we say so of all the innumerable species of plants and animals, and for each of the creations which distinguish the geological epochs? On the other hand, it is very bad policy for those (in the interest of a special, scientific, or philosophic solution) who make themselves the champions of science or philosophy, to demand from the guardians of tradition immediate concessions, when science and philosophy are still so little sure of their ways of action and their conclusions.

Some reconciliation has been arrived at on astronomical and geological questions, where philanthropy had no business, and which, besides, did not affect, in the same degree, religious tradition. The same reconciliation will, I have no doubt, take place also with regard to anthropology and ethnology; but it is in the nature of things that it should be later. Let us, then, discuss in our turn,—since we are obliged to, by our subject,—but discuss with all the liberty of thought these delicate questions. Let us separate what the author has himself separated so visibly, the natural and the supernatural; let us venerate what ought to be venerated; and let us not run the chance of profaning it by mixing it up with our scientific discussions.

If the aptitude of forming hybrid unions which possess a fecundity, which can be transmitted for an infinite number of generations, be taken as the definition of the specific unity of races, the question of the unity of the human races would be settled by one notorious fact,—that is, by the fecundity of the unions of such disparate races as the European with the Negro, Hottentot, and American. There remains an accessory question, but only of much interest from a physiological point of view,—that of determining if the hybrid race can preserve itself indefinitely with its medial characters; or if, in the absence of all new infusion of the blood of one of the original races, the products of the hybrids would finish by reverting to one of the two original types. Observations are said to have been made in both directions. Certainly, if it were proved that the hybrid type could not perpetuate itself indefinitely in spite of the formation of offspring, and in spite of the indefinite persistence of the prolific power, during successive generations, that would be a sign that nature had marked, by the most profound indications,

if not the separation, at all events the distinction of human races. Still, the mere fact of the aptitude for indefinite reproduction would be sufficient to establish, between all human races, a greater approximation than what exists between the nearest species of animals, which can by their unions only give birth to offspring of a limited fecundity. This would be at once a sufficient physical foundation for the sacred idea of humanity, such as would tend to increase the influence of those religious and moral opinions which are most worthy of our attention.

In addition to this strong proof of the close alliance of human races, which becomes a decisive proof of specific unity,—if we give to specific unity the only precise or logical definition which can be given to it,—the partisans of unity add an argument of equal force. They demand of their adversaries that they ought to come to some agreement on the distinct enumeration and the precise characteristics of the races which are to become the true unities of the naturalist, in place of the great unity which they uphold. And as all the labours of more than a century have not resulted either in a persistent enumeration, or in any fixed characteristic, as some unite what others separate, and separate what others unite, they have concluded, with great appearance of reason, that the races of man cannot be divided into a formal enumeration, or by fixed characteristics, which, say they, allow us only the idea of a single species to fall back upon.

Finally, encouraged by success they go still farther, and say, —the differences between one race and the other are of the same sort as those which are met with between individuals of the same race, and those which are produced by the accidents of generation, or the prolonged changes induced by climatic influences, and above all, by the mode of life. They are absolutely comparable to those which education and cultivation produce in our domestic races. We only reject the idea of a transformation of the one into the other, because our attention is struck by the contrast of the two extremes; for example, of the European and the Negro. It is true that the Negro, transplanted to St. Petersburg, remains a Negro, if consumption and pleurisy do not kill him; and the European transplanted into tropical regions, remains white there, if he does not die of cholera or yellow fever. But let us suppose that the negro population, natives of Guinea, were to make a long march to the Soudan, then to the foot of the Atlas, then to the Tell, then into Spain; or that, inversely, the white race were to be advanced, by long stages, from the temperate regions to the equator, modifying progressively also its mode of life: then the hypothesis of progressive transmuta-

tion—remaining an hypothesis all the same—would have nothing in it to shock common sense; so that we have good reason to hold by it so long as its impossibility cannot be actually demonstrated to us.

It is here that, for our own proper part, we find ourselves obliged to abandon the partisans of this hypothesis. There is an easy means of proving *à posteriori* the identity of the artificial races which man has created. Abandon them to themselves, in which case they all perish, or return rapidly to a single type, which is everywhere the same, and which must needs be the primitive type of the species. If, perchance, the type to which all return is different in one place from what it is in another, slight differences only denote a natural and local influence on the primitive type, completely independent of the artificial processes which have brought about the domestic races. Nothing analogous takes place in the human races. Certain differences between one race and another, whatever was the original cause, have been consolidated to such a point that there exists now no means of effecting the transmutation of one race into another. On all parts of the globe—in consequence of migrations, which are certainly very ancient, or of primordial causes which are entirely concealed—we find numerous examples of very distinct races who have lived side by side for a very long period, in spite of the identity of their exterior conditions. The differences in the mode of life between equally uncultivated populations, cannot explain the physical and psychological differences which present themselves; they are consequences, not causes. In spite of the influence of a civilisation of many thousands of years, and the prodigious changes in the mode of life which it must have brought with it, the lineaments of the Chinese still testify to the ties of relationship between other peoples which have not received the same cultivation. The lineaments of the ancient Egyptians recall the same African type, which is to be seen in tribes which remained savage. Neither the Chinese nor the Egyptian have approximated to the European type during their long civilisation, so far as to lose the trace of the original differences which separated them. It is true, one or two instances are given of such transmutations of type. The Magyars and Osmanlis have fixed themselves within the area of European civilisation, and are said to have acquired the European type, and to testify by their language alone their original affinity with the Finnish or Turkish races. But these instances are very doubtful; precisely because the circumstances of the admission, and other historical details, allow us to explain the same result by an infusion of foreign blood, very compatible with a permanence of idiom. Is it not the fact, that we talk a mixture of the Latin language without having a drop of Latin

blood in our veins? No comparison can be established between these instances, so doubtful, and so difficult to collect, and the clear and striking ones which present themselves in support of the opposite thesis.

As to the circumstance, that we find amongst the peoples of every race individual deviations from the type of the race (no matter whether physical or psychological), stretched to such a point as to bring together individuals belonging to the most dissimilar races; that proves nothing against the original distinction of races, any more than cases of monstrosity, properly so called, which introduce into the middle of a species the type of a neighbouring species, or even sometimes the type of a very distant species, prove anything against the original distinction of species. It will easily be understood that the relationship between human races being much more close than the relationship between species (whether congeners or not), that which passes, with reason, in the one case for a monstrosity, generally incompatible with the continuance of life in the individual, may easily, in the other case, be only a rarity, perfectly compatible with all the conditions of existence.

I shall have no hesitation in admitting that there are in the human family different races, whose differences cannot be assimilated to those which we create by education and culture in the midst of our cultivated species, but which are, on the contrary, permanent, native, and original, in the sense that they cannot be created by art; and that nature creates no more like them in the actual state of things, although she must necessarily have had (as all the world must needs admit) the means of producing them, and of causing one type to differ from another under different circumstances. So far as they are native and original in the sense which I am going to explain, the like differences between human races—which cannot be compared to the differences between the domestic races—may be compared to specific differences, although they are not of the same importance, and are, probably, not so old. In fact, if the human species has been the last, or one of the last, to appear amongst the superior species, as there is so much reason for believing, it would seem very consonant to the general order that the same causes which, in more ancient times, produced specific distinctions, only produced, later in the day, distinctions into permanent races, before arriving at the final order in which it would seem that not even permanent races are produced; although it is still possible to vary artificially the circumstances and conditions so as to produce deviations of types which would imitate the natural and original differences of another age, and even specific differences, if they were not entirely destitute of the attribute of permanence.

In this way, from the moment that the idea of specific unity is disengaged from the idea of the descent from a single pair, every difficulty vanishes. There is no longer any trouble in comprehending how, at the epoch of the consolidation of the autochthonous races, those characters might have shaded themselves over a vast expanse of country, of which the different points were submitted to analogous but not identical influences, in such a way that at the present day it is impossible to arrive at a decisive characteristic, or a precise enumeration which shall be accepted by all the world. The singularity is much more than takes place in the species of animals and plants; and there is certainly room for asking how the characteristic of species has been able to take the fixity we see in it, in the hypothesis now generally accepted, that the evolution of the same species took place on many points at the same time. On the contrary, whatever may have been the mysterious proceeding which Nature followed in the first evolution of living organisms, she would only have been consistent with herself, if she has ceased to admit, in the case of man, who has come after so many other species, distinctions as deep-seated as specific distinctions,—a fact proved by the criterion of the indefinite prolificacy of unions,—and if at the same time she has given up that fixity of characteristic and purpose, which is the companion of specific distinction, in beings of a less exalted organisation, and of more ancient origin.

The existing geographical distribution of the races of man does not seem (at least at first sight) connected in a necessary way either with climatic influences, or with the distribution or extension, or with the distances of the great continents, and the insular portions of the habitable globe, in the actual state of things. The most distinct races can and do inhabit, in contact one with the other, the same countries of the globe. The white race preserves all its features in North America; the black race, transported to the Antilles or the Brazils, does so likewise; and there is no reason why the American race should not live and perpetuate itself in Europe or in Africa. China can be inhabited by white men like those of Europe, and Europe inhabited by yellow men like the Chinese. We find at the eastern extremities of Asia, in the large adjoining islands, and even in the furthest archipelagoes of the great ocean, black races, inferior, autochthonous, that is longer established, in contact, at this time, with other races which have oppressed them, and trampled them under foot. How is it that these black races, scattered at great distances over a considerable portion of the southern hemisphere, have been able to occupy the islands alone, and not to gain the American continent, or at all events, not to multiply there? How do they come

to occupy those countries which are nearest the antarctic pole, whilst close to the equator, in Polynesia, we find a type superior to the Papuan, the Australian, and the Negro of Guinea? We can no more give an answer to most of these questions of origin, by reasons deduced from the existing state of things, than to most of the questions which concern the origin and the geographical distribution of the species of plants and animals. In every case, we must admit that the races of men, once constituted in the condition of autochthony, have enjoyed a power of extension and migration, differing in different races, but in general superior to that possessed by the species of plants and animals; so that we find collected on the same ground, and placed side by side, races which are distinguished by decisive characters, although in most cases there were but slight shades between them and their neighbours in their primitive indigenous condition.

Up to this point I have only noticed, whilst treating of the distinction and the origin of human races, those races whose formation is to be attributed to the sole and spontaneous action of nature, in conformity with the general plan to which even fortuitous accidents are subject, and which comprehends the totality of living species. But it would be strange, if the faculties peculiar to man, by which he withdraws himself in a certain measure from the empire of the general laws of nature, and which have the power of creating artificial varieties in the midst of domestic and cultivated species, which are hereditary without being permanent, should not also have the power to create analogues in the midst of the human species and the native races, permanent, inasmuch as their origin is of greater antiquity. In fact, it is quite sufficient for men to have formed separate societies, habitually hostile one to the other, between whom the differences of language, religion, manners, and mode of life, cause distinctions, engender antipathies, and put obstacles to sexual alliances; so that they can give birth to races comparable to those which are created artificially amongst the domestic species by the agency of mankind. Such races perish, not only by extermination, but also by the fusion or the dissemination of the surviving families in the bosom of another society. In the mixture between races, which are due to such an origin, the features are mingled in every way, and lost one in the other; whilst it is rather combination than mixture, in the cases of hybridity, between races naturally distinct. And in the same way that the hand of man is constantly necessary for the maintenance of the domestic race; so the persistent influence of the same social arrangements are necessary for the maintenance of hereditary varieties, or the races constituted by the effect of the grouping of men into castes or distinct societies.

I deduce from this idea a means of ascertaining the sense which ought to be attached, according to my notions, to the terms *anthropology* and *ethnology*. The use of these terms goes but a very little way back ; but the rapid progress of our modern sciences have very quickly extended their usage, without our having seen with sufficient clearness, or, at all events, without our having expressed with sufficient clearness, the distinctions to be observed in the application that is made of them. Anthropology is the natural history of man : consequently, everything that can be imputed in the constitution of the human species and its different branches, to the spontaneous action of natural forces,—which exercise over man the same mode of action as over other living species,—will necessarily come within the domain of anthropology.

Ethnology, on the other hand, will be occupied with all the accidental facts to which the circumstances of the grouping of men into distinct societies give birth, in conformity with the instincts of sociability, which otherwise spring from anthropology, so far as they make part of the common property of human nature, or as each of the primitive branches clothe themselves in special and characteristic forms. I shall then distinguish the two orders of the human races, or of the hereditary varieties in the human species, which have hitherto been called in question, and which sufficiently explain by their long confusion the entanglement of the subject, by qualifying the one as *anthropological* and the other as *ethnological varieties*.

Thus, let us compare an European with a Chinese, an American savage, a Negro, or an Hottentot ; and at the first glance, by one of those suggestions of good sense which science has no business to disdain, it will be plain at once that there are varieties of type which all the diversities or resemblance of rules and social institutions can never have the power to create or efface. They are of that order which we cannot reproduce by any factitious process, by any artificial experience, however prolonged it may be. We cannot find a sufficient explanation for them in the action of the elements and the surrounding media ; such at least as we find them to be in the existing world, and for a long succession of ages as is proved by the testimony of history and monuments. So that we are obliged to admit that the causes, whatever they may be, to which these characteristic differences must be imputed, must have already exercised, if not entirely exhausted, their action in times which history has no means of arriving at. On the other hand, when the question is of the characters by which the Arab, the Hellenian, the Celt, and the Saxon are contrasted, and many other races whose distinctive features seem to have had such a great influence on the series of historical events,

we feel easily enough that it is the business of history to explain, entirely or in part, how such races have been formed, perfected, become degenerate or extinct. We understand, also, that here the conclusions of the naturalist only fill an accessory part, for it is clear that they betray, by some perceptible varieties of organisation, contrasts which have a deeper origin, and which it is not impossible to explain historically, without departing from the conditions of the existing world, by the sole effects of the accidents which must have succeeded each other in the period of time allotted to the development of human societies.

To judge from the effect culture has had on our domestic species, we must expect to find diversities, which are to be imputed to ethnological influences, sometimes surpass in amplitude the native diversities, which are the business of anthropology, and the secret of which Nature has kept to herself. The two orders of hereditary varieties in the human species will therefore be distinguished; either by an instinctive appreciation which may sometimes be a little vague of the seal which Nature has impressed upon her works, or by the crucial observation of the fact of permanence. Thus, there is abundant proof that the races which inhabited the north of Europe in the time of Strabo, and who still inhabit it, are far from having preserved all the physical characters attributed to them by the ancients, and that they have been considerably modified in proportion as they have modified their mode of life on entering the paths of civilisation. We may observe, ourselves, in running through the countries of Europe, a great difference in this respect between the populations of the country and the towns. You may travel in a first class carriage in Germany, England, and France, almost without being aware of the change of country, if your companions think fit to keep silence; but if you look at the peasants who crowd round the station, you will soon see the populations are no more the same. On the other hand, can there be anything more curious in history than the persistence of the character so unanimously attributed to the Celtic race by all the writers of antiquity, which offers such a striking conformity with what all the world still says of the nations which have remained Celtic at bottom, spite of the infusion of foreign blood? Nevertheless these nations have passed, in the course of historic ages, through the most different phases of barbarism and civilisation. They have several times changed customs, laws, and religions. Some of them, a very rare thing, have forgotten their language, and adopted another offered to them by their governors or their priests. The ordinary signs to which people attach themselves are here found wanting. It is on the scene of history that we must study these people we are speaking

of, to understand that there is in their native organisation something to which one must attribute that moral temperament, that indefinable association of qualities and defects which is called by the particular name of *character*, in races as in individuals; which is not changed by education and mode of life; which is preserved in spite of the alteration or annihilation of the passions, which the individual generally carries along with him from the cradle to the tomb, and which, whilst it seems to belong to what is the most difficult to lay hold of, and most transitory in the modifications of the organism, has not the less the power of persisting longer than traits apparently more fundamental, or at all events more perceptible.

Besides, I do not mean to assert that there exists between these two orders of hereditary varieties, which we contrast with each other, one of those rigid demarcations which Nature admits but rarely, and as it were in derogation of her usual processes. On the one hand it is impossible to imagine man as living on the earth without a certain development of his social instinct, and without being influenced to a certain extent by his social surroundings. And on the other hand we must not lose sight of the fact, that if the grouping into tribes is of itself alone a cause of the constitution of hereditary varieties, the pre-existence of hereditary varieties of another order must have been in the earliest times and have remained ever since the principal cause of the alliances of families and of their being grouped into tribes. Now at what time did the epoch of primordial and permanent varieties close? No one can say, and it would be unreasonable to allow that that termination took place at any precise moment of time. Therefore, one must pay attention to the degrees of persistence and the shades we find in the emphasis of the differential characters. According to all appearance, the more ancient the separation is, the more marked and the more persistent are the characteristic differences; and the more also the causes of separation, whatever they may be, seem to have participated in the nature of those to which we must impute the construction of the hereditary varieties of the first order; of those, the determination of which lies in the province of the habitual studies of the naturalist, as being a consequence, and an echo of causes which long ago determined the differentiation of species.

Some ethnological varieties have sprung up and perished in the blaze, so to speak, of the torch of history; others go back to the times which have preceded the historical life of nations. Nothing is more interesting, at one epoch of Grecian history, than the contrast of the Ionian and Dorian races. The contrast is shown everywhere; in the language, the literature and the arts, the manners and

political institutions; and when we read in Thucydides the account of their conflicts, we seem to be dealing with insurmountable antipathies, because they are connected with indelible differences. Nevertheless we see, from the poems of Homer, that in his time they were far from attaching the same importance to the distinction of Dorians and Ionians; and a little time after Thucydides, the Greek populations were welded together in such a way as to leave very little trace of those distinctions of race and idiom which played so considerable a part at the epoch of the great historian. Much later history has enabled us to be present at the formation of an Anglo-Saxon race, victor and vanquished in turn, then recovering with its autonomy a new power of expansion and conquest, yet preserving through all its different phases a peculiar stamp which prevents us from confounding it with the other fractions of the same race, who have kept their continental habitat, and have not gone through the same career. Finally, in our own time we begin to perceive that the Anglo-American does not exactly resemble the Anglo-Saxon, who has remained on the opposite coast of the Atlantic, and no doubt the course of events and of centuries will produce the greatest possible diversities between the two severed branches of one family. Here, then, are examples of ethnological varieties and races of the second order, which branch out in the course of historical development and under the dominion of historical events.

Other hereditary distinctions, superior to these in consistence and durability, although less consistent than those which are independent of the social surroundings, have certainly preceded the commencement of history, properly so called. It is to the times which have preceded, not only the history that we possess, but all possible history, that we must refer the action of causes which have so sharply separated (very much more by psychological and moral characteristics than by the physical characteristics on which climates and mode of life have the principal influence) the Semitic family from the Indo-European, and also those which have effected in the bosom of this last family the separation of the Pelasgic, Celtic, Germanic, and Slavonic branches. We must not be surprised if the races created by a concurrence of causes which are historically known to us, do not display themselves with characters so pronounced and pure as those which belong to races of a pre-historic origin. It would only be conformable to the general order if, after the mixture of races of pre-historic origin (even though of ethnological origin in the sense explained above), and after the confusion of their idioms, there ceased to spring from such a mixture and such a confusion, new types, comparable for the consistence and precision of their characteristics to types which have

been spared by time, or to those which have perished, and whose remains have furnished the elements of a more recent and more imperfect formation.

It will easily be understood that the more of depth and consistence which are lost to the distinctive characteristics of races, the more difficult it becomes to determine them by observations made on individuals, compared with those which serve for the naturalist to establish the characteristic of species.

But that which is not manifested in a manner sufficiently precise and constant in individuals, may be seen very clearly when one tribe is compared to others. Characteristic differences, even of the same sort as those which have to do with physical and palpable things, may thus be put in evidence, which they could not be without the assistance which in that way the ethnologist lends to the naturalist. Besides, what interests us in the characteristics of human races of the second order, is not so much the physical characters which are appreciated by the senses, as the moral characters, the instincts, and the intellectual aptitudes, which are probably connected with modifications of the organism, which perhaps more exquisite perceptions and a more delicate anatomy will succeed in putting in evidence, without, after all, our getting any more insight into the mysterious bond which attaches the one to the other. Now all this most important part of the characteristic of races, which owes its origin or its development to the influences of social life, can only be known by ethnological observation : so that ethnology is the indispensable auxiliary of anthropology in the establishment or complement of the characteristics of races, even of those which might, if necessary, be clearly distinguished one from the other, independently of ethnological observations.

History renders services of the same kind to ethnology, and consequently (at all events indirectly) to anthropology. For there may be and there are gradations, such that their existence, or at least their importance, escapes the processes of ethnological investigation; whilst history, by bringing into relief, during a long series of centuries, certain peculiarities of the genius and the moral temperament of a race summoned to live in the light of history, comes to the assistance of the ethnologist and the naturalist, and acts towards them in some way like a new re-agent, more delicate and more sensible, and adapted to disclose varieties of type and organisation, which it would be difficult, and very probably actually impossible, to catch in any other way. In this sense history is like statistics, a method of manifesting by average and general results, a constant influence which is found screened in each individual case,

or in each situation taken by itself, by the particular circumstances which complicate it.

And if history, in this way of looking at it, must yield to statistics in precision, it agrees better, by its picturesque and animated forms, with the attractions of living Nature.

SLAVERY.

By JAMES REDDIE, Esq., F.A.S.L.

HON. MEM. DIAL. SOC., EDIN. UNIVER.

THERE can scarcely be conceived a more delicate or painful subject for impartial consideration and discussion than slavery. Nothing can be more easily disposed of, if we shut our eyes to all that we know of the world's history, to the facts of nature around us and the whole experience of the present generation, and start off with the indefinite axiom, that "all men are born equal", which we assume to be undeniable, and make the foundation of a mere Utopia. But the axiom is not true; and, if true, it would not settle the question. There is no such equality among those born in the same country, or even in the same family. Still less does it exist among the diverse races of mankind. If ever true, it is not true now; and, if ever true, those who say so have then to account for its non-continuance, and the development of humanity into something so totally different. They have also to justify to the world their attempt to reverse what has thus been the natural course of human progress. It is clear that to alter or reform the world and oppose its natural tendencies, they must rest upon some higher principle. But even if men were born equal, this would be of little consequence if they do not remain so. And the fact is, this so-called "axiom", in as far as it is not a truism, is utterly false or meaningless. Except that all men are born *equally men*, the saying is untrue; and when we consider the degradation of some of the *genus homo*, we instinctively feel that to make such a statement is to convey but a questionable appreciation of all that manhood implies.

We may, nevertheless, feel and speak thus, and yet also hesitate to become the advocates or apologists for the *right* of "whatever is", including the right of slavery. At the best we may be willing to concede that it can only be tolerated as a necessary evil, like many other evil things we should be glad to see extirpated from the world, if we only saw how to do it, without the creation of other evils as a consequence. If the mind of England has arrived in any degree at such a hesitating state of balance upon the question of slavery, it is